Vusion

Press release 5 June 2026 – 5.40 PM CET

Approval by the General Meeting of June 4, 2026, of the remuneration policy for corporate officers

In accordance with Article R. 22-10-14 IV of the French Commercial Code: *"The remuneration policy submitted to the general meeting of shareholders, together with the date and result of the most recent vote by the general meeting on the resolution referred to in II of Article L. 22-10-8, shall be made public on the company's website on the business day following the vote and shall remain freely available to the public for at least the duration of its application."*

I. RESULTS OF THE VOTES ON THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR CORPORATE OFFICERS

Resolutions	Votes cast				Abstention
	For		Against		
	Votes	**%**	**Votes**	%	**Votes**
13th Resolution: Approval of the directors' remuneration policy for the 2026 financial year	12 413 104	99,09%	114 269	0,91%	8 480
14th Resolution: Approval of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's remuneration policy for the 2026 financial year	12 320 429	98,34%	207 988	1,66%	7 436

II. CORPORATE OFFICERS REMUNERATION POLICY

The General Meeting of June 4, 2026, approved the directors' remuneration policy for the 2026 financial year (Resolution 13) as well as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's remuneration policy for the 2026 financial year (Resolution 14).

Extracts from the 2025 Universal Registration Document, sections 3.2.2.1 to 3.2.2.4:

3.2.2.1 Objectives and principles for determining the remuneration policy

The objective of the remuneration policy is to contribute to the achievement of the strategic plan, with a view to promoting the Company's performance and competitiveness and thereby ensuring its sustainability and growth.

The remuneration policy for directors aims to promote the presence on the Board of Directors of independent directors of foreign nationality with skills that are critical to the Company.

The remuneration policy for executive management incorporates incentive components aligned with the Group's strategy, which is focused on long-term profitable growth, conducted responsibly and in compliance with the Company's corporate interest and the interests of all stakeholders.

In accordance with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code, the Board of Directors and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee ensure that the following principles are respected when determining the remuneration policy:

- comprehensiveness: each component of remuneration is determined with regard to the overall remuneration package;
- balance and moderation: the different components of remuneration are assessed relative to one another to ensure that none is disproportionate;
- comparability: the remuneration policy takes into account market practices and the specific characteristics of the sector in which the Group operates;
- consistency: consistency is sought between the remuneration of executive corporate officers and that of the Company's employees. The Company also seeks to align performance criteria with its objectives;
- clarity of rules: the Company seeks to adopt remuneration rules that are simple, stable and transparent;
- consideration of multiple factors: the Company seeks to take into account, in its remuneration policy, (i) the Company's corporate interest, (ii) market practices, (iii) the performance of executives, and (iv) the interests of all the Company's stakeholders.

3.2.2.2 Process followed for determining the remuneration policy

Determination of the remuneration policy

The remuneration policy for each corporate officer is determined by the Board of Directors, upon recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and in accordance with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code.

This policy is reviewed annually by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Directors, taking into account changes in the Company's environment and needs, as well as the remuneration policies applied by comparable companies. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Directors also take into account the votes of the Annual General Meeting on remuneration, as well as the opinions expressed by the investor community and proxy advisors.

Management of conflicts of interest

In accordance with applicable legal provisions, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer does not take part in discussions or vote on matters relating to his remuneration.

3.2.2.3 Directors' Remuneration policy for the 2026 Financial Year

Overall amount of directors' remuneration

The Shareholders' General Meeting of June 17, 2025 set the maximum total annual amount of remuneration allocated to directors in respect of their office at €600,000, applicable to the 2025 financial year and until further decision by the General Meeting.

At its meeting of April 21, 2026, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, decided not to modify this amount.

In determining the total amount set in 2025, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Directors took into account benchmarking analyses of directors' remuneration, based on a panel of SBF 120 companies as well as a panel of European companies, as the market for directors is transnational. The U.S. market was not taken into account, as it would have resulted in too great a divergence from the Company's previous remuneration policy for directors. The companies included in the panel were as follows: Carrefour, Teleperformance, Technip, Nexans, Verallia, JCDecaux, Valeo, Soitec, Worldline, Lectra, Stroer, SES, Temenos, Delivery Hero, Nemetschek and Ocado. These companies were selected based on their market capitalization (to ensure comparability with Vusion), their business sector (retail or technology, where they may compete with the Company for director recruitment), or the composition of their boards (presence of foreign directors, particularly American and German nationals, these markets being key for the Group). This analysis showed that the total remuneration allocated to the Company's Board of Directors was below the average of the sample, while ensuring attractiveness at the individual level (i.e., per director). Indeed, the Company has chosen to remunerate only its independent directors, which allows for a lower overall envelope compared to companies in the panel, which also remunerate non-independent directors.

Allocation of the total annual remuneration of directors

At its meeting of April 21, 2026, the Board of Directors decided to propose to the 2026 General Meeting to maintain the allocation rules for the total annual remuneration of directors as approved by the General Meeting of June 17, 2025. These rules are as follows, it being specified that only independent directors receive remuneration.

Independent directors receive (unchanged from the previous financial year):

- a fixed remuneration of €12,000 per year, prorated where the director joins during the year;
- a variable remuneration based on attendance, of €8,500 per meeting, capped at €34,000 per year, with the cap prorated where the director joins during the year.

In addition, independent directors who are members of Board committees receive (unchanged from the previous financial year):

- **for the Nomination and Remuneration Committee**:
  - members: €4,000 per meeting, capped at €16,000 per year;
  - Chair: €7,000 per meeting, capped at €28,000 per year;
- **for the Strategy and ESG Committee**:
  - members: €4,000 per meeting, capped at €12,000 per year;
  - Chair: €7,000 per meeting, capped at €21,000 per year;
- **for the Audit Committee**:
  - members: €4,000 per meeting, capped at €20,000 per year;
  - Chair: €10,000 per meeting, capped at €50,000 per year.

Finally, the role of Vice-Chairman of the Board and Lead Independent Director is remunerated by a fixed annual sum of €10,000.

In accordance with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code, this structure is designed so that the variable portion represents the largest share of the remuneration.


The Company may not request directors to repay the variable portion of their remuneration.

This remuneration policy applies to directors appointed by the General Meeting as well as to any director

appointed by the Board of Directors between two General Meetings by way of co-optation to replace a departing director, as long as they are independent.

It is specified, however, that the Board of Directors noted that Mr. Blot would receive no remuneration in 2026 in respect of his office as a director, pursuant to Bpifrance's compliance policy, Mr. Blot being one of Bpifrance's executives and Bpifrance holding 7.78% of the Company's share capital.


Remuneration policy for independent directors



3.2.2.4 Remuneration policy for the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer for the 2026 Financial Year

Component	Included	Not included
Fixed remuneration	✓	
Annual variable remuneration	✓	
Free share awards (performance shares)	✓	
Exceptional remuneration	✓	
Severance indemnity	✓	
Non-compete indemnity	✓	
Supplementary pension scheme		×
Employment contract		×
Benefits in kind	✓	
Clawback clause		×

Target remuneration structure for objectives achieved



The Board of Directors reviewed the results of the votes relating to the remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at the last Shareholders' General Meeting held on June 17, 2025. For the record, the resolution relating to his remuneration for the 2024 financial year was approved by 93.55%, and the resolution relating to his 2025 remuneration policy was approved by 94.73%.

The Board of Directors also took note of the views expressed by the investor community as well as the reports issued by proxy advisory firms. A dialogue was maintained with these proxy advisors. On this basis, and upon the recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the Board of Directors will propose to the General Meeting to amend the remuneration policy of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer as follows:

- the introduction of new qualitative performance criteria governing variable remuneration, aimed at aligning it with the Company's strategy;
- clarification that any exceptional remuneration may only be paid in cash;
- the discretionary power of the Board to waive the presence condition for the vesting of performance shares in the event of the executive's departure will now be expressly excluded in cases of gross misconduct or willful misconduct. In other cases, the Board will retain this discretion, it being specified that the final number of shares will be calculated pro rata temporis based on the executive's presence during the vesting period (except in cases of death, disability, retirement or change of control);
- with respect to the statutory possibility to derogate from the remuneration policy in exceptional circumstances threatening the Company's sustainability or viability, the Board may only modify components already included in the remuneration policy approved by the General Meeting and may not introduce new components.

Any component of remuneration granted or paid to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer must comply with the remuneration policy approved by the General Meeting (ex ante vote). The payment of variable remuneration and, where applicable, exceptional remuneration awarded in respect of a given financial year will remain subject to approval by the Ordinary General Meeting of the components of remuneration and benefits of any kind paid during the past financial year or awarded in respect of that financial year (ex post vote).

Fixed and variable remuneration for 2026

The remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer comprises a fixed component and a variable component:

- the fixed component is intended to reflect the scope and complexity of the responsibilities assumed by the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, as well as the skills and experience he brings to the Company;
- the variable component depends on the achievement of predefined, precise, measurable, demanding and balanced objectives, directly aligned with the Group's budgetary targets and strategic plan.

The overall remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer takes into account the practices of comparable companies.

At its meeting of April 21, 2026, on the recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the Board of Directors decided to set, in line with the median of the peer group [1]:

[1] Study carried out in 2024 by an external provider, on a European sector panel including the following companies: CGG, Eutelsat, Lectra, Mersen, Neoen, SES, Soitec, Solutions30, Voltalia, X-FAB silicon foundries, Alfen, ASM International, AT&S Austria Tech, Basler AG, Nordic Semiconductor.

- the fixed component at €400k; and
- the variable component at a maximum amount of €400k (i.e., 100% of the fixed component).

The variable component depends on the achievement of quantitative objectives (up to €280k) and qualitative objectives (up to €120k), with no possibility of offset between the two (underperformance on quantitative objectives cannot be offset by overperformance on qualitative objectives).

The achievement of quantitative objectives is assessed as follows:

- performance is measured against the budget;
- for each quantitative criterion, a minimum achievement threshold is set below which no variable remuneration is payable for the relevant criterion. This threshold ranges from 80% to 85% of the target, depending on the indicator (except for EBITDA, for which the threshold corresponds to the EBITDA margin achieved in the previous year).
- In the event of outperformance of a given criterion, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may receive variable remuneration of up to 150% of the target amount for that criterion. This maximum (150%) is reached at an achievement level ranging between 110% and 120%, depending on the criteria.
- In any event, **the total variable remuneration payable to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer is capped at €280k for quantitative objectives and €120k for qualitative objectives, with no offset between the two**.

Indicators*	Weight	Amount if objective achieved
Quantitative (financial)	**(in %)**	**(in €)**
Revenue	20%	80,000
VAS (Value Added Services)	20%	80,000
EBITDA margin	20%	80,000
Net Debt/ EBITDA (ratio)	10%	40,000
Subtotal	**70%**	**280,000**
Qualitative (strategic and ESG)		
Captana and EdgeSense Acceleration	10%	40,000
Business development in North America	10%	40,000
ESG (Carbon intensity reduction, employee satisfaction, gender balance at management level)	10%	40,000
Subtotal	**30%**	**120,000**
TOTAL	**100%**	**400,000**

* The quantitative indicators are based on the Group's consolidated financial statements, using adjusted figures, and are described below:
- The revenue indicator is assessed against the target set in absolute value.
- The VAS (Value Added Services) indicator corresponds to revenue generated from software solutions and services, excluding electronic shelf labels.
- The EBITDA margin corresponds to the proportion of EBITDA in revenue; EBITDA is defined as operating income before depreciation, amortization and non-recurring or non-cash items.
- The ESG criteria indicator is composed of the following three sub-criteria:
  - Reduction in carbon intensity, measured using a ratio comparing Vusion's Scope 3 carbon emissions to its contribution margin. Achievement is assessed against a predefined target (weighted at 4% of variable remuneration);
  - Employee satisfaction, measured using the e-NPS (employee Net Promoter Score), an indicator that assesses employees' level of engagement and willingness to recommend the company (weighted at 3% of variable remuneration);
  - Gender representation at management level, measured by the proportion of men and women in management positions (weighted at 3% of variable remuneration).

Exceptional compensation

The Board of Directors may decide, upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee, to grant exceptional compensation to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, in light of very specific circumstances, such as the completion of a major transaction for the Company or the

Group. Such exceptional compensation may only be paid in cash and shall be capped at a maximum of 100% of the annual fixed remuneration.

Free allocation of performance shares

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may benefit from the free allocation of shares (performance share awards).

For each grant of performance shares to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors shall determine a maximum target number of shares that may be delivered at the end of the vesting period. It is specified that the grant value of such shares may not exceed 100% of the sum of the fixed compensation and the maximum annual variable compensation of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, i.e., €800,000.

The General Meeting of June 23, 2023, in its 17th resolution, set the ceiling for free share grants at 4.5% of the share capital at the grant date, with a sub-limit of 20% of this envelope applicable to executive corporate officers. For information purposes, the shares granted free of charge to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer in 2025 represented 0.05% of the share capital at the grant date.

This grant is subject to a continuous service condition and depends on the level of achievement of predefined performance criteria.

The vesting period and the period over which performance is assessed are three years, so that this component of compensation constitutes a long-term incentive, in line with the practices of other SBF120 companies.

With regard to performance criteria, the Board of Directors has decided, upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee, to retain the same criteria as those approved by the 2025 General Meeting.

a) Condition of continuous presence

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer must remain an executive corporate officer of the Company or of one of the Group's companies throughout the entire vesting period in order to receive the performance shares at the end of such period, except for the cases summarized below and described in the rules of the relevant plans. This condition, referred to as the "continuous service condition", must be satisfied at all times and without interruption.

In the event of termination of his duties as an executive corporate officer, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer shall forfeit his right to receive the performance shares granted to him since his appointment as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer for which the vesting period has not expired at the date of termination of his duties (except in cases of death, disability, retirement, or change of control, in which case the entitlement to performance shares shall be maintained under the conditions described in the rules of the relevant plans).

Except in cases of gross or willful misconduct, the Board of Directors shall have the authority, upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee, to waive the continuous service condition and maintain the benefit of performance shares on a pro rata temporis basis, without acceleration of the vesting period. Any such decision by the Board of Directors must be duly justified.

b) Performance criteria

With regard to the performance criteria applicable to grants to be made in 2026, the Board of Directors, upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee, has decided to set the following criteria:

Performance indicators*	Weight
Revenue	25 %
VAS (value added services)	20 %
EBITDA margin	30 %
TSR (total shareholder return)	15 %
ESG: Reducing carbon intensity	10 %
TOTAL	**100 %**

* The quantitative indicators are determined on the basis of the Group's consolidated financial statements and are detailed below:
- The VAS (Value Added Services) indicator corresponds to revenue generated from software solutions and services, excluding electronic shelf labels.
- The EBITDA margin corresponds to the proportion of consolidated EBITDA in revenue; EBITDA is defined as operating income before depreciation, amortization and non-recurring or non-cash items.
- The TSR indicator corresponds to "Total Shareholder Return", a criterion measuring share performance that combines share price appreciation and dividends paid in order to calculate total shareholder return. This criterion is assessed by comparing the Company's ranking in terms of TSR with the TSRs of the other companies included in the SBF 120 index.
- The reduction in carbon intensity is measured using a ratio comparing Vusion's Scope 3 carbon emissions to its gross margin on variable costs.

The target achievement levels for these criteria have been predefined by the Board of Directors, upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee, based on the budget, but are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons.

It is specified that TSR is a criterion measuring share performance, combining share price appreciation and dividends paid in order to calculate total shareholder return.

This criterion will be assessed by comparing the Company's TSR ranking with that of other SBF120 companies. The introduction of this criterion aimed to diversify the nature of the quantitative variable compensation criteria and to ensure that one of these criteria reflects the Company's performance relative to its peers.

The Board has also decided to retain common criteria between the annual variable compensation and the performance share awards, in order to ensure that short-term performance does not come at the expense of long-term performance.

The achievement of targets will be measured according to the following rules:

Each performance criterion will be assessed annually on a scale from 0% to 150%, with 100% corresponding to the expected performance based on the annual budget or the target approved by the Board of Directors. The final achievement rate for each criterion will then be averaged over the duration of the plan.

A final "threshold" level of achievement has been set for each criterion, below which no performance shares will be delivered for the relevant criterion:

- This threshold ranges between 80% and 85% of the target for criteria relating to revenue, VAS, and carbon intensity.
- For the TSR criterion, any performance below the median TSR of the SBF120 results in no award for this criterion.
- For the EBITDA criterion, if the figure is lower than that of the previous year, no performance shares may be delivered for this criterion.

In any event, the overall level of achievement of the performance conditions is capped at a maximum of 100%, meaning that the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may not receive a final number of performance shares exceeding the number initially granted.

c) Shareholding retention obligation

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer will be required to hold in registered form, until the end of his term of office, a minimum of 20% of the shares that have vested definitively.

Minimum number of registered shares to be held

In accordance with applicable legal provisions, the Board of Directors has set a minimum number of shares that Mr. Thierry Gadou must hold in registered form until the end of his duties:

- The Board of Directors, at its meeting of December 21, 2017, acknowledged Mr. Thierry Gadou's significant investment as a shareholder of the Company and his holding commitments. It therefore decided to set at 20,000 the minimum number of performance shares (free shares) to be held directly until the end of his term as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.
- The performance share plans implemented under the authorization of the Extraordinary General Meeting of June 29, 2020 (24th resolution) specify that corporate officers benefiting from share grants undertake to retain in registered form, until the expiry of their term of office for any reason whatsoever, 30% of the shares received at each vesting date.
- The performance share plans implemented under the authorization of the Extraordinary General Meeting of June 23, 2023 (17th resolution) specify that corporate officers benefiting from share grants undertake to retain in registered form, until the termination of their duties for any reason whatsoever, 20% of the shares granted to them at each vesting date.

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer has formally undertaken not to enter into any hedging transactions with respect to the performance shares that he is required to hold in registered form until the end of his duties.

Severance indemnity and non-compete indemnity

In accordance with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code, the aggregate amount of severance benefits and non-compete compensation is capped at two years of fixed and variable compensation. In addition, the payment of severance benefits is subject to performance conditions.

Severance indemnity

In the event of termination of his duties, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer is entitled to severance benefits.

Such severance benefits shall only be payable if the following conditions are met:

- triggering event: termination of the duties as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Vusion in the event of dismissal (except in cases of gross or willful misconduct) or resignation occurring within six months following a change of control of Vusion;
- amount: a lump-sum indemnity equal to 18 months of fixed and variable compensation, with the variable compensation used for the calculation corresponding to the average of the last two annual variable compensations actually paid to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer;
- performance condition: this condition shall be deemed satisfied if at least 75% of the quantitative targets have been achieved on average for the bonuses of the two years preceding the termination of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's duties.

A "change of control" is defined as the acquisition by a third party of at least 40% of the share capital of Vusion, whether on-market or off-market, including following a takeover bid for the Company's shares.

It is specified that no severance benefits shall be payable in the event of retirement of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

Non-compete indemnity

Upon termination of his duties for any reason whatsoever, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer shall be bound by a non-compete obligation. He is prohibited from:

- working for a company engaged in a competing activity;
- engaging or having an interest, directly or indirectly, in any competing activity, in any form whatsoever (including as a self-employed individual or as a shareholder holding more than 3%

of the share capital or voting rights);

- engaging or having an interest, directly or indirectly, in any form whatsoever, or investing in any form whatsoever (including as a shareholder), in the companies Hanshow, Pricer or ZBD;
- soliciting, hiring, or attempting to hire any person who is or has been employed by Vusion or any of its subsidiaries within the preceding 12 months, with a view to using that person's knowledge or skills for the benefit of any individual or entity conducting activities competing with those of Vusion.

"Competing activity" means any activity involving the design, marketing or installation of electronic shelf labeling systems.

This non-compete obligation applies in the following countries: France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Sweden, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Canada, the United States and South Africa.

This clause is limited to a duration of one year from the end of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's term of office. At the end of this one-year period, Vusion may renew the restriction for an additional year.

In consideration for the non-compete obligation, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer shall receive, following the effective termination of his duties and throughout the duration of the restriction, a fixed monthly indemnity equal to 50% of his gross monthly fixed compensation.

Any breach of this non-compete clause would entitle Vusion to seek an injunction to cease the prohibited competitive activity, including under penalty payments, without prejudice to any damages to which it may be entitled.

Similarly, any breach of the non-compete obligation would release Vusion from the payment of the indemnity. The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer would then be required to repay the amounts received, together with interest at the legal rate from the date of formal notice to cease the competing activity, without prejudice to any damages.

Vusion may release the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer from the non-compete obligation at the end of his term of office. In such a case, no indemnity shall be payable.

Payment of the non-compete indemnity is excluded if the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer exercises his retirement rights and, in any event, beyond the age of 65.

Pension scheme

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer does not benefit from any pension scheme.

Remuneration in respect of the directorship

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer does not receive any compensation in respect of his office as a director.

Other benefits granted to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

- Membership in the GSC insurance scheme.
- Benefits in kind: in the performance of his duties, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer is provided with a company car.

Use of clawback provisions for variable compensation applicable to corporate officers (executive and non-executive)

The remuneration policy does not provide for any clawback mechanism applicable to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. However, it is recalled that (i) no compensation not previously approved by the General Meeting under the ex ante vote on the remuneration policy may be granted or paid to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and (ii) the payment of any variable or exceptional compensation is subject to ex post approval by the General Meeting.

Vusion

Press release 5 June 2026 – 5.40 PM CET

Derogation from the remuneration policy in exceptional circumstances

In accordance with Article L.22-10-8 III of the French Commercial Code, in exceptional circumstances, the Board of Directors may temporarily derogate from the application of the remuneration policy, provided that such derogation is consistent with the Company's corporate interest and necessary to ensure its sustainability or viability.

In such circumstances, the Board of Directors may only amend components of compensation already provided for in the remuneration policy previously approved by the General Meeting, in order to take into account such exceptional circumstances.

Any such derogation shall be decided by the Board of Directors upon recommendation of the Nominations and Compensation Committee. In accordance with Articles L.22-10-8 and L.22-10-34 of the French Commercial Code, the payment of variable or exceptional compensation components shall remain subject to a binding ex post vote of the General Meeting of shareholders and may only be made if approved.

About Vusion

Vusion (formerly VusionGroup) is the global leader in AI-powered digitalization solutions for physical commerce, serving over 350 major retail groups in the world.

The group develops technologies that bring together the Internet of Things (IoT), data, and artificial intelligence (AI) to power Connected Commerce — transforming physical stores into intelligent, efficient, and sustainable environments for retailers, associates, and shoppers. It provides stores with solutions for operational excellence, local ecommerce, data-driven commerce, and retail media & shopper experiences. Through its integrated ecosystem, comprised of three layers, Vusion Intelligence, Vusion Connect, and Vusion Retail IoT, Vusion delivers the Artificial Intelligence of Things (AioT) for retail, helping the industry unlock higher performance, better experiences, and more responsible growth.

A pioneer in Positive Commerce, Vusion is committed to building a more sustainable, transparent, and human-centered retail future. The company supports the United Nations Global Compact initiative and has received a Platinum Sustainability Rating from EcoVadis, the world's reference for business sustainability ratings.

Vusion is listed in compartment A of Euronext™ Paris and is a member of the SBF120 Index.

Ticker: VU – ISIN code: FR0010282822 – Reuters: VU.PA – Bloomberg: VU.FP

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